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This paper studies a collective decision problem in which a group of individuals with
interdependent preferences vote whether or not to implement a public project of un-
known value. A utilitarian social planner aggregates these votes according to a majority
rule; but, unlike what is commonly assumed in the literature, the planner is unable to
commit to the rule before votes are cast. Characterizing the time-consistent majority
rules, we ﬁnd that the ex ante optimal majority rule is time-consistent; but for groups
whose members have suﬃciently homogenous preferences, there is an ex ante subopti-
mal rule that is also time-consistent. Thus, in the absence of an ex ante commitment,
the social planner prefers a relatively heterogeneous group in which strategic voting in-
centives are weak. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast with the observation that under an
exogenously given majority rule, the social planner prefers the most homogenous group.
Applications to trial jury and advisory committee formations as well as academic hiring
decisions are discussed.
JEL Classiﬁcations:C 7 ,D 7
Keywords: time-consistency; majority rule; heterogeneity, group decision-making
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many collective decisions are made by a group of individuals with conﬂicting or heteroge-
nous preferences: even if all the information about an alternative were publicly available,
individuals would not unanimously agree whether or not it should replace the status quo.
∗I thank Dan Graham, Silvana Krasteva, Tracy Lewis, Sergiu Ungureanu, Justin Valasek, and participants
of Duke Theory Lunch Group for comments. All remaining errors are mine.
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In this paper, we argue that it may nonetheless be in a group’s best interest to have mem-
bers with heterogenous preferences because such members vote less strategically, enabling
a utilitarian social planner to credibly commit to the (ex ante) optimal voting rule. Thus,
at the heart of our argument lies a potential time-consistency problem associated with the
decision rule to aggregate votes.
Examples abound in which the issue of time-consistency of voting rule could be para-
mount — either because one is not announced to voting individuals, or because the an-
nounced rule is not binding. For instance, in an academic hiring or promotion case, the
faculty members in the relevant department often submit conﬁdential yes/no votes about
the case, without exactly knowing the administration’s voting rule. Similarly, in the pub-
lication process, a set of independent referees express their opinions as to the publication,
without being told of the editor’s aggregation process. Finally, as with many advisory com-
mittees, when the members of a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committee
evaluate a new drug application, they commonly take a simultaneous approve/disapprove
vote, without fully knowing the FDA’s acceptance standard. The voting procedures in these
examples contrast with those in trial juries and congressional committees, where individuals
are informed of the majority rule in advance of casting their votes.1
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that even in the absence of a publicly announced voting
rule, rational agents will form rational expectations about the rule and tailor their voting
strategies accordingly. Our main objective in this paper is to determine equilibrium or
time-consistent majority rules that the social planner can credibly adopt.2 Our formal
model is a modiﬁed Condorcet Jury setup. A group of  agents vote whether or not to
implement a public project of unknown value. Before casting his binary vote, each agent
costlessly receives an independent private signal about the project,3 but his valuation also
depends on others’ signals. Thus, agents’ valuations are interdependent,4 ranging from the
1We elaborate on some of these examples in Section 5.
2Our objective is, however, not to propose a theory as to why the social planner may choose not to
commit to a voting rule, because such a theory would require a more context-dependent modeling than ours.
For instance, a university administration may not announce a voting rule for one department because it may
then be required to apply the same rule to other departments.
3While the assumption of costless information is standard in many Jury decision problems, in many
others, it may seem extreme. We maintain this assumption since, as explained below, it distinguishes our
argument for heterogeneity from the ones that rely on costly information, and since it is quite possible that
voters are presented with the information source such as candidate dossiers, drugs’ clinical trials, etc.
4Interdependency of valuations is a convenient form of introducing correlation among agents’ preferences
and has been widely exploited in the mechanism design literature (e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Maskin
(2000), and Myerson (1981)).
2most heterogenous group with pure private values to the most homogenous group with pure
common values. Based on their private signals (and, on the event of being pivotal) agents
simultaneously submit their votes to a utilitarian social planner, who, by construction, does
not have a direct preference for group heterogeneity. The planner accepts the project if and
only if it receives  or more aﬃrmative votes. As suggested above, she may, however, be
unable to commit to the rule before votes are cast.
For an exogenous majority rule, , we show that there is a unique symmetric voter
equilibrium such that each agent approves the project if and only if his signal exceeds
ac u t o ﬀ. Using this equilibrium, we ﬁnd that the social planner prefers an increasingly
homogenous group. This is surprising due to the fact that agents with more homogenous
preferences are also the ones who vote more strategically as they place a greater weight
on others’ signals and thus on the information gleaned from being pivotal. Nonetheless,
homogenous agents’ overall incentives turn out to be better aligned with those of the social
planner’s.
When the social planner could choose the majority rule, we show that she would commit
to the one that leads to “sincere” voting in the sense that each individual votes based only
on his signal (and not on being pivotal). This is intuitive since the social planner in our
model cares simply about the information held by agents, and voting is most informative
when it is sincere. What is less intuitive is the observation that the optimal voting rule is
time-consistent. That is, in the absence of an ex ante commitment, there is an equilibrium
in which the social planner sets the optimal voting rule and agents vote sincerely. In fact,
under a mild hazard rate condition on signal distribution, we ﬁnd that this “optimal”
equilibrium is unique provided that agents’ preferences are suﬃciently heterogenous so that
their strategic voting incentives are suﬃciently weak. Thus, in sharp contrast with our
ﬁnding for an exogenously given majority rule, when the rule is endogenously chosen, it is
in the best interest of the group to be the most heterogenous.
When preferences are suﬃciently homogenous, however, strategic voting incentives are
so strong that there also exists a (unique) suboptimal equilibrium in which the social planner
deviates from the optimal rule and agents vote strategically. The direction of the planner’s
deviation is such that as the group becomes more homogeneous, she lowers her majority
requirement, and in anticipation, agents adopt a higher standard of approval. Thus, all else
equal, we predict that with the same number of aﬃrmative votes, projects are more likely
to be accepted if these votes come from a more homogenous group; though individuals in
3such a group are less likely to vote aﬃrmatively.
Our characterization of time-consistent majority rules also reveals that the unanimity
rule is unlikely to be optimal. Moreover, as the group size grows, any time-consistent
percentage rule approaches the rule for the most heterogenous group. This makes sense: in
a larger group, each agent has a better prediction of the average of others’ signals, which
weakens the preference interdependence and increases heterogeneity.
Our key results on social planner’s preference for group heterogeneity appear consistent
with trial jury and the FDA’s advisory committee selection procedures, which we discuss
in Section 5.
Related Literature. Building on Condorcet’s (1785) pioneering work, there is an
extensive early literature on voting as a means of information aggregation in committees,
which is ably summarized by Grofman and Feld (1988), and Li and Suen (2009). Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) ﬁrst pointed out that sincere voting assumed in this literature is
unlikely to occur in equilibrium “even when individuals have [such] a common preference.”5
Our analysis reveals that individuals with a common preference may actually vote the most
strategically; but, from an ex ante viewpoint, it may still be in the group’s best interest to
have members with a common interest. In a series of papers, Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997, 1998) have investigated the consequences of strategic voting on information
aggregation in large common value elections for a given majority rule; and in particular,
they have demonstrated that the unanimity rule performs poorly in this regard. Ignoring
the integer problem, we also show that the unanimity rule is never socially optimal under
more general preferences with interdependence.
More closely related to our analysis is the recent strand of the strategic voting literature
concerned with committee design in which a social planner forms a committee and commits
to the decision rule to achieve the dual goal of motivating agents to collect costly information
and aggregating this information eﬃciently. Allowing for more general decision rules than
simple threshold rules, Gerardi and Yariv (2008), Gersbach (1995), Gershkov and Szentes
(2009), and Li (2001) present various common-values settings and show that the ex ante
optimal decision rule is, in general, ex post ineﬃcient. That is, the social planner is willing
to commit to wasting some information ex post to incentivize agents to gather information
ex ante. Persico (2004) examines a similar committee design problem but with threshold
voting rules, as in our model. The optimal majority rule in his common-values setup turns
5Ali et al. (2008) oﬀer some experimental evidence in favor of strategic voting in a Condorcet-type model.
4out to be ex post optimal. Unlike this set of papers, we consider committees composed of
members with heterogenous preferences, and how heterogeneity aﬀects the social planner’s
choice of the majority rule if she cannot commit to one. Moreover, we do not have costly
information acquisition; so any divergence between the ex ante and ex post optimal voting
rules must be due to strategic voting incentives.
Perhaps, most pertinent to our work are the papers by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999),
Cai (2009), and Che and Kartik (2009), among others, who construct cheap-talk type models
and ﬁnd that some degree of preference heterogeneity in the group may be desirable because
such heterogeneity encourages agents to invest in information, while partially compromising
with information transmission. Hence, in these models, if information were costless, then
it would be socially optimal to have a homogenous group. In ours, on the other hand, a
heterogenous group may still be socially desirable to allow a credibly commitment to the
optimal voting rule. Finally, Gruner and Kiel (2004) consider a collective decision situation
with interdependent valuations much like ours but where private signal is one’s continuous
policy preference. They compare the performances of mean and median aggregation rules;
so they do not consider optimal or time-consistent rules, which are at the crux of our paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out
the model. In Section 3, we investigate voter equilibrium and group welfare under a ﬁxed
majority rule. In Section 4, we allow the social planner to choose the majority rule with
and without commitment. Finally, we oﬀer some applications of our key results in Section
5. Proofs that do not appear in the text are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
A group such as an academic department or FDA advisory committee contains  ≥ 3 risk-
neutral agents who need to make a collective decision whether or not to implement a public
project such as a faculty hiring or a new drug. At the time of the decision, the exact value
of the project is unknown, but agent  costlessly receives an independent private signal, ,
say through the candidate’s scholarly work or drug’s clinical tests, about the value from a
diﬀerentiable c.d.f. () and p.d.f. () over [] where   0   and []=0 .W e
assume that ’s valuation of the project takes the following form:




5where  ∈ [01]. In words, agent ’s valuation is a convex combination of signals of all group
members, placing more weight on his own.6 The parameter  in (1) traces the degree of
(preference) heterogeneity, or conﬂict, in the group in the sense that as  increases, agents’
realized payoﬀs get closer.7 In particular, while  =0refers to the most heterogenous group
with pure private values, i.e.,  = ,  =1refers to the most homogenous group with
pure common values, i.e.,  =
P
 . We normalize agents’ reservation payoﬀsf r o mnot
implementing the project to 0.S i n c e[]=0 , this normalization implies that no ex ante
bias for or against the project exists, allowing us to highlight the informational issues.8 For
analytical convenience, we will restrict attention in the analysis to non-extreme values of ,
i.e.,  ∈ (01), though one can always take the limits.
Upon obtaining their private signals, the agents simultaneously submit their binary
approve(+)/disapprove(−) votes for the project to a risk-neutral social planner, e.g., the
FDA or the university administration. The planner aggregates these votes and renders a
decision according to a majority rule,  ∈ {1} such that the project is implemented if
and only if it receives  or more aﬃrmative votes. The planner is a utilitarian agent acting








where the equality follows from (1). Note that  is independent of , which means that
the group heterogeneity does not have a direct eﬀect on the group’s welfare, though it will
have an indirect eﬀect through equilibrium voting. Note also that  is the average welfare
per group member, which eliminates the scale eﬀect of group size.
It is worth emphasizing that the social planner in our model does not have her own
information and she cares only about the group’sw e l f a r e .T h i si sw i t h o ut loss of generality
if, as in the mechanism design literature, the social planner’s problem is a metaphor for group
members’ joint decision as to how to aggregate information. However, if the social planner
is considered a real decision-maker such as the FDA or an editor, then the assumption of
being utilitarian is important, as it is conceivable that these decision-makers may have their
6A sa l l u d e dt oi nF o o t n o t e4 ,s u c h( l i n e a r )f o r m so fi n t e r d e p e n d e n tv a l u a t i o n sa r ec o m m o n l yu s e di nt h e
mechanism design literature. Maskin (2000) provides a Bayesian inference interpretation as to why agent
’s valuation depends directly on others’ signals (see his Example 2.2).
7Formally, | − | =( 1− )| − |.
8We have also extended the model to include a status quo bias, i.e., [] 6=0 , but, given that such
extension had no qualitative eﬀects on our results, we have chosen to present the simpler case with no such
bias.
6own agenda or biases weighing against the group’s welfare. Modeling these biases seems to
be context-dependent, in which case our investigation here without them can be viewed as
a ﬁrst step in this direction.9
We begin the analysis with characterizing voters’ equilibrium behavior for an exoge-
nously given majority rule, and then proceed to endogenizing the rule.
3 Exogenous Majority Rules
Let the majority rule, ,b eﬁxed and publicly known by all group members before they
cast their votes. Aside from serving as a building block for the next section, the analysis of
an exogenous decision rule is of independent interest because in many collective decision-
making situations such as jury trials and congressional committees, majority rules are set
in the “constitution,” much in advance of the arrival of any issue or project, and thus any
particular group to consider it.
Note that since signals about the project are independently drawn and  strictly in-
creases in ,i ti sr e a d i l yv e r i ﬁed that agent  follows a cutoﬀ voting strategy such that for
some signal b ,h ea p p r o v e st h ep r o j e c ti f  b  and disapproves it if   b .10 Given ex
ante symmetry among agents, we consider symmetric voter equilibrium throughout.
Suppose that all agents but  adopt a cutoﬀ, b . In determining his cutoﬀ, agent  needs
to evaluate only the event in which his vote is pivotal; namely the event in which there are
exactly  − 1 approve (+) and  −  disapprove (−) votes except for his. Using (1), agent
’s expected payoﬀ conditional on being pivotal and privately observing  is






[( − 1)+(b )+(  − )−(b )]
where +(b ) ≡ [|b ] and −(b ) ≡ [|b ]. The cutoﬀ b  is part of a symmetric
voter equilibrium if and only if the signal  = b  also leaves agent  indiﬀerent between
approving and disapproving the project, or equivalently b  solves
 (b ;b )=0  (3)
Lemma 1. For any feasible ,a n d, there exists a unique symmetric voter equilibrium.
9Even in these examples, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the decision-makers rarely overrule the
group’s recommendation — an indication of how heavily they care about the group’s welfare.
10His decision when indiﬀerent is, of course, immaterial to our analysis as  = b  i saz e r op r o b a b i l i t y
event.
7The existence follows from the fact that at a symmetric cutoﬀ with the lowest signal,
agents always reject the project and at the cutoﬀ with the highest signal, they always accept
it. The uniqueness follows because the expected valuation in (3) strictly increases in the
cutoﬀ. In the next two lemmas, we further characterize the voter equilibrium.11
Lemma 2. In the voter equilibrium,   b ()  ; b ( +1 )  b ();a n d
b ()  b (+1 ).
Lemma 2 says that the voter equilibrium is strictly interior, and that it satisﬁes some
well-known properties articulated in the strategic voting literature (e.g., Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998)): Given a ﬁxed group size, the
majority rule, , and individuals’ equilibrium approval standards are inversely related. As
t h ed e c i s i o nr u l er e q u i r e sm o r ea ﬃrmative votes for acceptance, individuals relax their
equilibrium standards to vote aﬃrmatively because they have a more positive view of the
project in the event of being pivotal. By the same logic, ﬁxing ,a ni n c r e a s ei ng r o u ps i z e
means more disapproval votes in the pivotal event, leading each agent to raise his standard.
To investigate how b () changes with ,l e tu sﬁrst introduce the notion of “sincere”
or nonstrategic voting in our model. Agent  is said to vote sincerely if he conditions his
vote only on his private information (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)). Given
that the reservation payoﬀ is 0 and []=0(so no ex ante bias toward the project is
present), sincere voting is equivalent to adopting a cutoﬀ of 0 in our model. That is, an
agent who votes sincerely and receives a positive (resp. negative) signal about the project
approves (resp. disapproves). In general, as implied by Lemma 2, strategic voting does not
lead to sincere voting owing to the fact that rational agents try to infer others’ information
in equilibrium; and since the amount of this information depends on the majority rule, they
tend to correct the “bias” caused by the majority rule in their strategies. The extent of this
correction depends on the weight an agent attaches to others’ signals, or equivalently on
the degree of group homogeneity. Nonetheless, for one speciﬁc majority rule, sincere voting
may result. Let  = () be this rule. Setting b  =0in (3), and solving and simplifying
for ,i tf o l l o w s , 12
 = () ≡ (0) + (1 − (0)) ×  (4)
11T h er e a d e rm a yw i s ht or e v i e wE x a m p l e s1a n d2b e l o wa l o n gw i t ht h er e s u l t s .
12To be more precise, 
()=
+(0)−−(0)
+(0)−−(0) ; but, since, by conditional expectations, (0)×
−[0]+(1−
(0)) × 
+[0] = [], and by assumption, []=0 , the expression in (4) is obtained.
8For instance, for a symmetric signal distribution, we have (0) = 1
2;s os i n c e r ev o t i n g
equilibrium is obtained whenever ()=+1
2 for an odd , coinciding with the Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) ﬁnding for symmetric binary signals. For expositional convenience,
we assume () is an integer in the remainder.13
Lemma 3. In the voter equilibrium, b ()=  b ()=  ()−. Moreover,
−(b ())  0  +(b ()).
To understand Lemma 3, suppose  (). Since the majority rule () leads to
sincere voting, a less stringent rule induces agents to adopt a more demanding approval
standard (or a higher cutoﬀ): knowing that the acceptance of the project requires few
aﬃrmative votes, each agent has a negative expectation of others’ signals in the event of
being pivotal and compensates this by raising his standard of approval. More importantly,
in a more homogenous group, i.e., a greater , this negative expectation of others’ signals
is reinforced, making the agent in question raise his standard further. When the majority
requirement is more stringent than (), a similar line of reasoning shows that each agent
possesses a positive expectation of others’ signals and thus reduces his approval standard
in a more homogenous group. Together, we can say that agents vote more strategically in
a more homogenous group in the sense of moving their cutoﬀ away from the sincere voting
cutoﬀ of 0. Although strategic voting can induce an individual to approve the project when
his signal is negative or disapprove it when his signal is positive, the last part of Lemma
3 reveals that an agent who approves (resp. disapproves) the project must have a strictly
positive (resp. negative) expected signal in equilibrium.
Armed with voters’ equilibrium strategies, we ask the following two questions: given
the majority rule, is the group better oﬀ being more or less homogenous? And, is a more
homogenous group more or less likely to accept the project? To answer these questions,
note that for an arbitrary voting cutoﬀ, , the probability that there are exactly  approval




[1 − ()]()−, and with this vote
proﬁle, the ex post group welfare (before payoﬀs are realized) is
(;) ≡
+()+(  − )−()

 (5)
13If it were not an integer, sincere voting equilibrium would simply not exist for any ; but none of our
results depends on such existence. What matters for our results, say for Lemma 3, is that the equilibrium
cutoﬀ changes sign for some , which is always true.











For  = (), neither the welfare nor the acceptance probability is aﬀected by the
group homogeneity, because sincere voting is obtained independent of . The following
result shows that this observation changes dramatically for  6= ().
Proposition 1. Fix the majority rule at  6= (). Then, the ex ante welfare in equilib-
rium strictly increases as the group becomes more homogenous. In addition, a more
homogenous group is strictly less (resp. more) likely to accept the project if  ()
(resp.  ()).
Proof. Suppose  6= (). Then, b () 6=0 .T o p r o v e t h e ﬁrst part, note from
Lemma A1 in the Appendix that
(;)=−(; − 1− 1) × () ×
£






(b ())=(b ()) ×b ()
=  −
h
( − 1)+(b ()) + ( − )−(b ()) +b ()
i
×b ()
Now, note that the equilibrium condition in (3) implies that ( − 1)+(b ()) + ( −
)−(b ()) + b ()=−1−

b (). Inserting this fact along with b ()=  b () from
Lemma 3, we obtain


(b ())=  
1 − 

(b ())2  0
To prove the second part, observe that by using simple algebra (;)=− ×
(; − 1− 1) × ()  0. Then,


(b ();)=(b ();) ×b ()
=  −b ()=   − (),
10where the last equality is due to Lemma 3. ¤
Proposition 1 is a key ﬁnding of this paper. It reveals that when the voting rule is ﬁxed
at a level that induces strategic or “insincere” voting in equilibrium, the social planner
strictly prefers the group to be the most homogenous. This ﬁnding is surprising for two
reasons: ﬁrst, recall from (2) that the social planner does not have a direct preference for
group composition in our model; so any such preference must come from voters’ equilibrium
behavior; second, in light of Lemma 3, members of the most homogenous group are also the
ones who engage in the most strategic voting, and thus mostly likely to ignore their own
private information [see Lemma 3]. To see the intuition behind the planner’s preference,
notice that for a given majority rule, the ex ante welfare is single-peaked in voters’ cutoﬀ:
Conditional on accepting the project, the planner wants the cutoﬀ to be high so both an
approve and a disapprove vote would mean a relatively positive signal (see eq. (5)); but a
high cutoﬀ makes approve votes unlikely. Thus, for a ﬁxed majority rule, there is a unique
socially optimal voting cutoﬀ, which can only be reached in the voter equilibrium by agents
who are social-minded, or in our context, by agents who have no preference conﬂict, i.e.,
 =1 .W h e n 1, the social optimum cannot be reached, and how close it can be
approached in equilibrium depends on how well agents correct the bias introduced by the
majority rule in their voting strategies. Consider, for instance,  (). As indicated
above, when the majority requirement for acceptance is low, agents fear that the project
may be accepted too easily and therefore adopt a strictly positive voting cutoﬀ.H o w e v e r ,
since they place strictly more weight on their own information about the project, they tend
to choose too low a cutoﬀ in equilibrium. As implied by Lemma 3, a positive equilibrium
cutoﬀ increases as  increases, or group becomes more homogenous, bringing the ex ante
welfare closer to the optimal one. A similar logic applies to the case of  (): agents
choose a strictly negative cutoﬀ, which is too high; and again, as  increases, the cutoﬀ
decreases, improving the ex ante welfare. Overall, it follows that for  6= (),t h es o c i a l
planner strictly prefers the group to be composed of more homogenous members.
Proposition 1 also reveals that how the equilibrium probability of accepting the project
changes with the degree of group homogeneity depends critically on the majority rule, as
i m p l i e db yL e m m a3 .F o r (), agents choose a high (positive) approval standard in
equilibrium, which increases in the degree of group homogeneity, and reduces the probability
of acceptance. The opposite conclusion holds for  (): agents choose a low (negative)
approval standard, which decreases in the degree of group homogeneity, and in turn increases
11the probability of acceptance.
Proposition 1 helps put some basic observations regarding strategic voting in Condorcet-
type models in perspective. As Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) ﬁrst demonstrated, for a
ﬁxed majority rule, sincere voting is unlikely to occur in equilibrium (except for a speciﬁc
majority rule; () here) “even when individuals have [such] a common preference”. Our
investigation uncovers that voters with a common preference may actually behave the most
strategically as they place the highest weight on the information inferred from being pivotal.
While this seems bad for information transmission and thus for the group welfare, Propo-
sition 1 says that from an ex ante point of view, the group may, nonetheless, beneﬁtf r o m
having members with a common preference due to its eﬀect on probability of acceptance.
The following example illustrates most of our ﬁndings thus far.
Example 1. Consider a group of 5 agents, who each independently draw a signal from a
uniform distribution on [−11]. Trivial algebra shows that agents’ equilibrium cutoﬀ
is given by b  = 
5−2(3 − ),a n d =  =3induces sincere voting. Clearly, b 0
and strictly increases in  for 3 whereas for 3, b 0 and strictly decreases










16(5−2)6  =2 4
Three remarks about Example 1 are in order. First, the ex ante welfare is equal across
 =1 5 and across  =2 4. This is a consequence of strategic voting: agents adjust their
voting strategies to the voting rule, and for a symmetric signal distribution, like the uniform
used here, this adjustment is complete. For instance, b  = 2
5−2 and b  = − 2
5−2 for  =1
and  =5 , respectively. Second, for each  6=3 , the ex ante welfare strictly increases in ,
as indicated by Proposition 1. And third, the ex ante welfare is hump-shaped in , attaining
a maximum at  =  =3 — an observation we will prove holds in general.
4 Time-Consistent Majority Rules
Up to now, we have examined environments in which the majority rule to aggregate votes
is exogenous. While, as mentioned above, there are many such environments including
jury trials and congressional committees, in many others, the majority rule is tailored
12to the speciﬁc group or committee in question. In fact, the recent literature on committee
design deals with identifying ex ante optimal majority rules that the social planner commits
to before votes are cast (see, Li and Suen (2009) for a survey). Our focus here is on
complementary settings where the social planner is unable to commit to a decision rule
when asking for votes. For instance, in academic hiring cases, the faculty members in the
relevant department often submit conﬁdential yes/no votes, which are then relayed to the
university administration. Similarly, when the members of an FDA advisory committee
evaluate a new drug application, they frequently convey their recommendation to the FDA
by taking a simultaneous approve/ disapprove vote. Finally, in the publication process, an
editor solicits independent opinions of a group of experts, and renders the ﬁnal decision by
aggregating these opinions. In all these examples, the individuals who vote are rarely told —
if at all — exactly how many positive votes are needed for a positive decision on the project.
In such environments without an ex ante commitment, the social planner cannot act as a
Stackelberg leader when choosing the majority rule; rather she can choose the majority rule
that best responds to agents’ voting strategies, and in anticipation, agents best respond
to the planner’s majority rule when submitting votes, eﬀectively playing a simultaneous-
move game. Suppressing parameters  and  for now, let (∗∗) be an equilibrium pair of
majority rule and voting cutoﬀ in this game, which, by deﬁnition, lies at the intersection of
the players’ best responses:






∗ = b (∗) (9)
Since the ex post welfare, (∗;), strictly increases in the number of approve votes,
,a n d(∗;)  0 given that ∗ 6=  by Lemma 2, (8) can be simpliﬁed as ∗ =
argmin (∗;) subject to (∗;) ≥ 0. That is, the social planner’s equilibrium
choice of majority rule must be ex post optimal. This makes sense. Lacking the ex ante
commitment to a majority rule, it is best for the social planner to choose one after observing
the votes.14 Note that ∗ is the majority rule that can be credibly adopted by the social
planner, or said diﬀerently, it is the rule that is time-consistent. Note also that the planner
14Notice, though, we do not require the rule to be ex post optimal; rather it is a consequence of the social
planner’s equilibrium choice.
13need not publicly announce ∗ a si tc a nb ei n f e r r e db yg r o u pm e m b e r si ne q u i l i b r i u m .T o
establish a benchmark and understand the value of ex ante commitment, we now ﬁnd the
ex ante optimal majority rule, (), and determine if it is time-consistent.
Proposition 2. The ex ante optimal majority rule is the one that induces sincere voting,
i.e., ()=()=(0) + (1 − (0)) × ; and it is time-consistent.
Proof. T h es o c i a lp l a n n e r ’ se xa n t ep r o b l e mc a nb es t a t e da s
max

(;) s.t.  = b ()
By Lemma A1, (;)=−(;−1−1)×()×[( − 1)+()+(  − )−()+].
Since the expression, ( − 1)+()+(  − )−()+, is strictly increasing in ; strictly
negative at  = ; and strictly positive at  = , it follows that (;) is strictly
quasi-concave in , with an interior maximum. Given the (equilibrium) constraint,  =
b (), this maximum must occur when (b ())=0 ,o re q u i v a l e n t l yw h e n h
( − 1)+(b ()) + ( − )−(b ())
i
+b ()=0 . In addition,  (b ();b ())=
0 by (3). Thus, the optimal cut-oﬀ must be  = b ()=0 . This means that  must
satisfy: ( − 1)+(0) + ( − )−(0) + 0 = 0, whose unique solution is  = (),a s
g i v e ni n( 4 ) .
To prove that  is time-consistent, we need to prove that the social planner does not
have an ex post incentive to change the majority rule from  upon observing the votes and
conjecturing a cutoﬀ,  =0 . Given that ( − 1)+(0) + ( − )−(0) = 0,t h ee xp o s t
welfare with  ≥  approve votes is positive because (0− ) ≥ (0;− )=
+(0)
  0, whereas the ex post welfare with  ≤  − 1 approve votes is strictly negative
because (0− ) ≤ (0; − 1−  +1 )=−
−(0)
  0.H e n c e ,  is ex post
optimal given  =0 .S i n c e , g i v e n  = (),w eh a v e =0as a best response,  is
time-consistent. ¤
Proposition 2 has three implications. First, the ex ante optimal majority rule results
in sincere voting. This is intuitive because, being a utilitarian agent, the social planner’s
objective given in (2) is independent of the group heterogeneity. Namely, the planner cares
only about individuals’ signals, which are most informative when votes are sincere. Second,
(ignoring the integer problem) the ex ante optimal rule is always less than unanimity.15
15For instance, for a symmetric signal distribution, we have (0) =
1





14In particular, as negative signals become more likely, the optimal rule moves away from
unanimity, and vice versa. This may appear counter-intuitive, because the social planner
should require a larger consensus in order to avoid a negative value project; but given our
normalization that []=0 , a greater probability of negative signals, (0),a l s om e a n s
a higher positive value attached to an aﬃrmative vote, +(0), to keep the mean at zero,
requiring fewer positive votes to accept the project. This observation may lend additional
support to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) who point out the weaknesses of the unanimity
rule in a Condorcet Jury problem in the presence of strategic voting. Finally, Proposition
2 indicates that upon inducing individuals to vote sincerely by committing to an ex ante
optimal majority rule, the social planner has no ex post incentive to deviate from it. To see
why, consider the marginal event in which the planner receives −1 approve and −+1
disapprove votes. The ex ante rule,  dictates that the project be rejected in this event.
And this is exactly what the planner does ex post, because sincere voting requires that the
expected sum of −1 signals with  −1 approve and − disapprove votes be 0,w h i c h ,
in turn, requires that with one additional disapprove vote, the ex post welfare be strictly
negative.
Given that the majority rule,  generates the highest ex ante welfare and it is time-
consistent, we call the pair (∗∗)=( 0) the optimal equilibrium. The existence of the
optimal equilibrium suggests that despite the social planner’s lack of commitment to an ex
ante decision rule, group members may still vote sincerely by holding an equilibrium belief
that the ex ante optimal rule will be used. Such a belief, however, may not be unique. In
particular, when the group is suﬃciently homogenous, we will show that there is often a
suboptimal equilibrium in which group members believe that the social planner will deviate
from the optimal rule and vote strategically as a result. The characterization of suboptimal
equilibrium is important since it not only points to a welfare loss due to the commitment
problem, but also points to what other majority rules can be time-consistent depending
on the group composition. In what follows, we impose a mild distributional assumption to
provide a full characterization.







Condition HR is a familiar one from the mechanism design literature and satisﬁed
by most well-known distributions, including the uniform and normal (see, Bagnoli and
15Bergstrom (2005) for an extensive list.).16 An implication of this condition is that the
diﬀerence +() −  decreases in  (see Lemma A2), leading us to
Proposition 3. Suppose that Condition HR holds. Then,
(i) there is a lower bound of group homogeneity, () ∈ (01) such that a unique subop-
timal equilibrium exists if and only if  ≥ ().
(ii) When it exists, the suboptimal equilibrium, () is characterized by17
()=d(1 − (())) × e (10)




e  =0 .
Proposition 3 is another key ﬁnding of this paper (along with Proposition 1). Part
(i) indicates that for a suﬃciently heterogenous group, i.e.  (), only the optimal
equilibrium exists. To see this, consider the most heterogenous group, i.e.  =0 ,w h e r e
each member cares only about his own signal. In this case, each member has a dominant
strategy of voting sincerely independent of the majority rule. This means that the social
planner can implement the ex ante optimal rule without publicly committing to it. By
continuity of voting strategies, commitment is still of no value to the social planner for a
group that is not too homogenous because strategic voting incentives in such a group is still
relatively weak. When the group is suﬃciently homogenous, however, agents’ strategies
deviate from sincere voting so much that the social planner may respond by deviating from
the optimal rule, engendering a suboptimal equilibrium.
A major implication of part (i) is that in the absence of ex ante commitment, the social
planner would not prefer the group to be the most homogenous to avoid the suboptimal
equilibrium. This is in sharp contrast with Proposition 1, which shows that under an exoge-
nously set majority rule, the planner would prefer the group to be the most homogenous.
16Many well-known distributions that are diﬀerentiable, and that satisfy []=0and Condition HR
appear to be symmetric, but it is easy to construct asymmetric distributions with the same properties such
as this one: ()=
½
 + 




2   ∈ [0
√
]
,w h e r e ≈ 82 and  ≈ 145. Besides, as indicated in
Footnote 8, our model could easily be extended to signal distributions with nonzero means.
17de denotes the usual ceiling function.
16And, it is also in contrast with Proposition 2, which shows that under an optimally set ma-
jority rule, the planner is neutral to the group composition because she is able to engender
sincere voting for any degree of group homogeneity.18
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 provides an explicit description of the majority rule in a
suboptimal equilibrium, which allows us to determine all time-consistent rules in our model.
Given that the social planner deviates from the optimal majority rule in a suboptimal
equilibrium, it is important to discern the direction of this deviation. That is, does the
planner adopt too stringent or too lenient decision rule in a suboptimal equilibrium? And,
how does this rule change with the degree of group homogeneity and group size? The
following result answers these questions.
Proposition 4. Suppose  ≥ ().T h e n , () decreases in ,a n d() 
(). Moreover, there exists () ∈ (()1) such that ()=1for  ≥ ().
According to Proposition 4, in a suboptimal equilibrium, the social planner requires
fewer aﬃrmative votes to accept the project than it is optimal. She further relaxes her
majority requirement as the group becomes more homogenous; because members of such
a group adopt a higher standard of approval in equilibrium. In fact, for a suﬃciently
homogenous group, only one aﬃrmative vote may be enough for acceptance. To gain some
intuition why the suboptimal decision rule is less stringent than the optimal one (as opposed
being more stringent), recall that the social planner picks the majority rule that is ex post
optimal, or formally +[]+(−)−()=0(ignoring the integer problem). This
implies that, in the event of being pivotal, each agent holds a strictly negative expectation of
others’ signals because (−1)+()+(−)−()=−+()  0,19 and in turn,
chooses a strictly positive cutoﬀ in equilibrium. From Lemma 3, we know that this positive
cutoﬀ rises, or equivalently strategic voting incentives intensify, as the group homogeneity,
or , increases. In particular, in a more homogenous group, agents’ equilibrium strategies
diverge from sincere voting, and in response, the social planner relaxes her equilibrium
majority requirement.
One implication of Proposition 4 is that all else equal, with the same number of positive
votes, a project has a greater chance of being implemented if these votes come from a
homogenous group; or said diﬀerently, a greater consensus is required for projects submitted
18Recall that 
() is independent of .
19because, by Lemma 3, 
+[
]  0 in equilibrium.
17by a heterogenous group.20 This does not mean, however, projects that are evaluated by a
homogenous group are more likely to be accepted because members of such groups are less
likely to vote positively. We now illustrate our ﬁndings in this section.
Example 2. Consider the setting in Example 1. Consistent with Proposition 2, the ex
ante optimal majority rule is  =3 .T o ﬁnd the suboptimal equilibrium, we solve
for (∗∗) from the best-responses: (∗;∗)=0and ∗ = b (∗);a n dﬁnd
∗ =
25(1−)
10−9 and ∗ = 
10−9. But this solution is an equilibrium if and only if ∗
is an integer, or else we take its ceiling as indicated in Proposition 3. From here, it
follows that for  ∈ [0 5
7), the unique time-consistent majority rule is ∗ =  =3 .
For  ∈ [5
7 15
16), there is a unique suboptimal equilibrium with  =2 ;h e n c et i m e -
consistent rules are ∗ =2and 3.F i n a l l y ,f o r ∈ [15
161], time-consistent rules are
∗ =1and 3. In terms of ex ante welfare along equilibrium path,  = 094 for all
 at the optimal equilibrium since  =3is independent of . Using Example 1, the









16 ≤  ≤ 1
Note that () is non-monotonic in  ∈ [5
71]: it strictly increases within each
subinterval because  remains ﬁxed and Proposition 1 applies; but at the neighbor-
hood of  = 15
16, () jumps down from 087 to 065 as  switches from 2 to 1,
and diverges further from the optimal majority rule,  =3 .
Our investigation up to now can also inform us how equilibrium majority rules change
with group size, . Using (4) and (10), it follows that both the optimal and suboptimal
majority rules, () and (),i n c r e a s ei n. This is not surprising, however, given the






Proposition 5. Take a sequence of  such that integer problems do not arise. Then, along
this sequence, the percentage majority rule,
()
 , increases whereas
()
 decreases
20This observation yields the following testable prediction: all else equal, acceptance of papers in a general
interest journal is likely to require a greater consensus among reviewers than those in a ﬁeld journal because
the reviewers of the former are more likely to possess heterogenous preferences owing to their potentially
diﬀerent ﬁelds of research.
18in .A s →∞ , both percentage rules converge to 1−(0), which would be obtained
for any  if  =0 .
To grasp intuition behind Proposition 5, note that the correlation between agents’ val-
uations gets weaker in a larger group because, by the logic of the law of large numbers,
each agent has a sharper prediction of the average signal of others.21 Thus, much like in
a more heterogenous group, agents vote less strategically in a larger group, alleviating the
social planner’s commitment problem and allowing her to raise the percentage rule in a
suboptimal equilibrium. As group size grows without bound, the strategic voting incentive
vanishes completely, and the percentage rule converges to the one that would be obtained in
a group with pure private values, i.e.,  =0 . While the same limit applies, the percentage
rule in the optimal equilibrium decreases in group size.
5 Applications and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis yields two main results. When the voting rule is ﬁxed, a utilitarian social
planner wants the group to have members with the most homogenous preferences despite
the fact that they tend to vote the most strategically. However, when the planner chooses
the voting rule, but cannot commit to it before votes are cast, she wants the group to
have members with the most heterogenous preferences because they tend to vote the least
strategically, relaxing the planner’s commitment problem.
There seems to be supporting evidence for these results. For instance, in jury trials
where the voting rule is ﬁxed by the constitution,22 our theory suggests that jurors should
be selected to have as homogenous preferences as possible; and the strict jury selection
process, called voir dire, in the U.S. and other common law countries appears to do just
that. By allowing both sides’ attorneys to examine potential jurors, the process aims to
eliminate strongly prejudiced or unqualiﬁed jurors from the pool to ensure a fair trial. In
contrast to jury formation, the FDA encourages its advisory committees to be composed
of members with diverse preferences in that the committees should contain not only the
technical experts but also consumers and industry advocates as voting members.23 Similar
heterogeneity among voting members seems to be in place in faculty hiring cases too, because
21It is easy to verify that ( )=
(2−)
 .
22See Starr and McCormick (2001) for various unanimity and nonunanimity verdict requirements, and the
details of jury selection process in general.
23See http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143538.htm
19often all faculty in a department are eligible to vote on a candidate regardless of their ﬁelds
of research. These two examples are also consistent with our theory, since, unlike the jury
trials, a voting rule is usually not announced to the FDA committee or to the faculty before
votes are submitted. Thus, according to Proposition 3, the social planner should indeed
favor a heterogenous group.
In closing, we should note several issues that were not addressed here. As mentioned,
our model does not explain why the social planner such as a university administration or the
F D Am a yn o tw a n tt oc o m m i tt oav o t i n gr u l e .In our opinion, a more context-dependent
model as to the role of the social planner above and beyond aggregating information from
the committee is needed to achieve this objective. For instance, the planner may have other
economic and political concerns weighing against the group’s welfare. Another issue we have
not addressed is pre-voting communication of private information. Although many commit-
tee voting models assume away such communication, some recent papers have pointed out
its potential importance on voting outcomes (Coughlan (2000), Gerardi and Yariv (2007)).
While some communication between voters does occur in many real examples, like Persico
(2004), we believe that there are probably certain institutional and physical barriers to this
communication, and the assumption of no communication may not be totally unrealistic.
Nonetheless, it would interesting to enrich the present model with this dimension and see
how it interacts with the time-consistency problem and the preference for group hetero-
geneity. Finally, one may introduce “asymmetric” heterogeneity within the group in that
each member may attach a diﬀerent weight on others’ signals, which may or may not be
privately known.
206A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . To save on notation, let  (;) ≡  (;).S i n c e
+()  −() for any  ∈ [],  (;) strictly increases in . Together with the
assumption that []=0 ,i tf o l l o w s (;) ≤  (;)=[ 1−(−1)
]  0,a n d
 (;) ≥  (;1)=[ 1−(−1)
]0. In addition, since (with appropriate limit











it also follows (;)  0. From these three facts, we conclude that there exists a
unique solution, b (),t o (b ;)=0 . ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .The fact that   b ()   is directly obtained from the
proof of Lemma 1. Next, suppose that, in the voter equilibrium, b ( +1 ) ≥ b ()
for some . Then, since, by the proof of Lemma 1,  (;) strictly increases in  and
,w eh a v e
 (b ();) ≤  (b ( +1 );) (b ( +1 ); +1 ),
which implies  (b ();) 6=  (b ( +1 ); +1 ). But, in equilibrium,
 (b ();)= (b ( +1 ); +1 )(= 0)
yielding a contradiction. Hence, b (+1)  b (). Using a similar line of argument
and noting that  (;) strictly decreases in ,i tf o l l o w sb ()  b (+1 ). ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .Diﬀerentiating both sides of the equilibrium condition in (3) with
respect to ,w eﬁnd: b ()=−
(b ())
() . Next, observe that (b ())=−
b ()
 . Since, in
addition, ()  0 and 0, it follows that b ()=  b ().T o p r o v e t h e
second sign, ﬁxa n y ∈ (01).B yL e m m a2 ,b () ∈ (). Using (3), simple algebra shows
that b (1)=−1
 [b (1) − −(b (1))]  0,a n db ()=−1
 [b () − +(b ()]  0.
Since, by Lemma 2, b () strictly decreases in , there must be a unique 0 ∈ {2−
1} such that b ()  0 for  0,a n db () ≤ 0 for  ≥ 0,w i t he q u a l i t yo n l yi f0
is an integer. But, by deﬁnition, 0 = , as given in (4). To prove the last part, suppose,
to the contrary, that +(b ()) ≤ 0.S i n c e−()  +(),t h i si m p l i e st h a t−(b ())  0.
Moreover, since  (b ();)=0by (3), we must have: b ()  0. But, this means
+(b ())  0, yielding a contradiction. Hence, +(b ())  0. A similar argument shows
−(b ())  0. ¤
21Lemma A1. T h ee xa n t ew e l f a r es t a t e di n( 6 )s a t i s ﬁes
(;)=−(; − 1− 1) × () ×
£







[1 − ()]()− as deﬁned in text.
Proof. In this proof, we do not impose the assumption []=0 .T o s a v e s p a c e , l e t
 ≡ 1 − () in this proof. Then,
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−1(1 − )− ©
( − 1)+()+(  − )−()+
ª

Substituting back for  ≡ 1 − (), the desired result for (;) is then obtained. ¤
Lemma A2. Under Condition HR, 
[+() − ] ≤ 0 for any  ∈ [].
Proof. Let ∆() ≡ +() − ,a n d() ≡
()
1−(). By Condition HR, 0() ≥ 0.
Simple diﬀerentiation shows that +0()=()[+() − ],
∆0()=()∆() − 1 and ∆00()=0()∆()+()∆0()
Let  ≡ ∆0. N o t et h a ts i n c e() is diﬀerentiable, () is continuous. Moreover, a
recursive limit argument implies that () →− 1
2 as  → 
−
. Next, suppose (0)  0 for
some 0 ∈ [). We will argue that this should imply ()  0 for all  ∈ (0),a n dy i e l d




Suppose (1) ≤ 0 for some 1 ∈ (0). Then, there exists some b  ∈ (0 1) such that
(b )  0 and 0(b ) ≤ 0. On the other hand, given 0(b ) ≥ 0, (b )  0 implies 0(b )  0 —
a contradiction. Thus, ()  0 for all  ∈ (0).B u t ,s i n c e(
−
)  0, ( − )  0 for a
small 0 — a contradiction. Hence, ()=∆0() ≤ 0 for all  ∈ []. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . It is more convenient to ﬁrst prove part (ii). Suppose
that Condition HR holds. Then, Lemma A2 above implies that +(e ) − e  is decreasing
in e , which, in turn, implies that (e ;) is strictly decreasing in e .M o r e o v e r , s i n c e
23+[]=[]=0and +[]=,w eh a v e(;)  0 and (;)  0. Together, there
must be a unique solution () ∈ () to (e ;)=0 .N e x t ,o b s e r v et h a t(∗;)=
(∗;) because  (∗;)=0by (3) and (∗;)=
+(∗)+(−)−(∗)
 by (5).
This means that the equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) can be replaced by (∗;) ≥ 0
and ∗ = b (∗),w h e r e∗ is the smallest integer that satisﬁes the inequality. Suppose
∗ = () is an equilibrium cutoﬀ. Then, (();)=0 ,w h i c h ,s o l v i n gf o r,
yields e  =
−−(())
−−(())++(()). Using conditional expectations, note that in general,
[]=P r { ≥ ()}[| ≥ ()] + Pr{ ≤ ()}[| ≤ ()],w h i c h ,g i v e n[]=0 ,
reveals that




Hence, e  =[ 1− (())] × .C l e a r l y , e  ∈ (0).B u t , ∗ = () is part of an
equilibrium only if e  is an integer, in which case ∗ = e , as given in Lemma 4. If e  is not an
















)  () by









) as stated in part (ii). Given the uniqueness of
(), there can be at most one equilibrium pair such that (∗ ∗) 6=( 0), completing
the proof of part (ii).
To prove part (i) of Proposition 3, note ﬁrst that (;) strictly increases in  and
strictly decreases in ; and, as a result, () strictly increases in  and strictly de-
creases in . In addition, () has the following limit properties: lim→0 ()=0 ;
lim→1 ()=;a n dlim→∞ ()=0 . Together, these imply that ()
decreases in  and increases in .M o r e o v e r , lim→0 ()=d(1 − (0)) × e and
lim→1 ()=1 .N o t et h a t(1 − (0))× = ()−
+(0)
−−(0)++(0) by (4). Since ()
is an integer by assumption and
+(0)
−−(0)++(0) ∈ (01),w eh a v elim→0 ()=().
Given that () decreases in ; lim→0 ()=();a n dlim→1 ()=1 ,
there is some () ∈ (01) such that ()=() for all  (),a n d() 
() for  ≥ ().S i n c e , b y d e ﬁnition, () is part of a suboptimal equilibrium
whenever () 6= () and ()=() by Proposition 2, the desired conclusion in
part (i) is obtained. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .The ﬁnding that () decreases in ,a n d() 
() directly follows from the proof of Proposition 3. Again, from the same proof, we
know lim→1 ()=1 . Thus, there exists () ∈ (()1) such that ()=1for
24 ≥ (). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .Take a sequence of  such that integer problems do not arise.




 +1− (0),w h i c h
strictly decreases in , and converges to 1 − (0) as  →∞ . Next, using Proposition 3,
note that
()
 =1− (()) when integer problem is ignored. Then, since ()
strictly decreases in  and converges to 0, it follows that
()
 increases in  and converges
to 1 − (0) as  →∞ . As mentioned in the text, for  =0 , sincere voting is obtained for




 =1− (0). ¤
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